Moral status, epistemic agency, and the education of students labeled with intellectual disability

Students labeled with intellectual disability, including those with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities, are subject to numerous practices that diminish or demonstrate disregard for their status as knowers. The widespread acceptance of epistemically undermining educational practices aligns with a prominent philosophical conception of equal moral status, which we reject. The alternative conception of moral status that we outline brings into view a developmental dimension that is often ignored in moral status debates. We argue that epistemically undermining educational practices are morally and epistemically demeaning toward intellectually disabled students when and because they betray a basic moral obligation to protect students’ formative opportunities within educational contexts. We show that epistemically undermining practices constitute a serious wrong to students in their capacity as knowers. Evaluating the moral adequacy of educational practices requires a concern for the diverse, pluralistic conditions under which students’ epistemic capacities might be enabled to grow and develop.